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Abstract
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn
affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may
bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is
played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-
price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that
signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
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1 Introduction
Many market transactions have an auction structure, and many such auctions are
recurring events. For example, price competition between retailers is essentially
a (reverse) auction. And this auction is typically a recurring event in which the
relevant valuations (unit costs) are stable, at least for some time. Evidently, in
this case bidders must pay attention to the information they reveal about their val-
uations through their bids. This gives rise to a problem of strategic information
transmission.
The present paper analyzes equilibrium bidding in a sequence of first-price auc-
tions, when bidders have stable private values. Bidders want to win each auction,
but they are also concerned with concealing their valuation in order to reduce the
intensity of price competition.
If bidders play strictly monotone strategies in the first auction, they reveal their
private information, and the second auction is one under complete information, re-
sulting in fierce competition that wipes out profits. Bidders thus attempt to keep
their rival unsure about their valuation by playing non-monotone strategies, mim-
icking the bidder with a low valuation with some probability.
2 The model
Consider a sequence of two first-price auctions for two identical objects, and two
ex ante symmetric bidders, named 1 and 2. Bidders draw their private valuation
before the first auction and keep that valuation in second one. Before the second
object is auctioned, bidders observe both bids of the first auction, and use this
information to update their beliefs concerning their rival’s valuation. Valuations V
are iid random variables which assume either a low value 0 (normalized) or a high
value v > 0 with the prior probability ρ := Pr{V = v} ∈ (0,1).
If bidders tie, the winner is selected by flipping a fair coin, with one exception:
If bidders tie in the second auction and exactly one bid was positive in the first
auction, the one who made a positive bid in the first auction is selected as the
winner.
We denote bidder i’s bid in the j-th auction by b
j
i , and continuation payoffs by
pi(h), where h denotes the history of the game prior to the second auction.
The possible histories of the game, h, are described by past bids observed by both
players. The following histories must be distinguished; there, only the sign of
observed bids matters: 1) The history at the beginning of the game, h /0; 2) the
histories with both bids either zero or positive: h00 := {b11 = 0,b12 = 0} and h11 :=
{b11 > 0,b12 > 0}; 3) the histories with one positive bid and one bid equal to zero:
h10 := {b11 > 0,b12 = 0} and h01 := {b11 = 0,b12 > 0}.
3 Equilibrium
A bidder with valuation V = 0 obviously bids zero with certainty in both auctions
(which will not be repeated from here onwards). This does not, however, imply that
a zero bid can only come from a bidder with valuation V = 0. Indeed, in a signal-
jamming equilibrium a bidder with V = v may also bid zero in the first auction in
order to keep his rival in doubt about his valuation.
We now solve the equilibrium strategies of a bidder with valuation V = v in both
auctions, for all possible histories of the game, employing the equilibrium concept
of a sequential equilibrium with observable moves.
As a working hypothesis, suppose F : [0, b¯]→ [0,1] is the unique symmetric equi-
libriummixed strategy of a bidder withV = v in the first auction (history h /0), where
F(0) may be positive. This allows us to characterize the equilibrium play in the
second auction, and then confirm the working hypothesis concerning the equilib-
rium play in the first auction. To avoid unnecessary duplication we state only the
equilibrium strategies and beliefs of one player, named player 1.
Equilibrium in the second auction After the first auction, bidders observe bids,
process this information to update their beliefs about the rival’s valuation, and then
play the second auction. Updated beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium
strategy of the first auction and the observed bids. Hence, using Bayes’ rule when-
ever applicable, posterior beliefs are:1
Pr{V2 = v | b12}=
{
1 if b12 > 0
F(0)ρ
F(0)ρ+(1−ρ) =: q if b
1
2 = 0.
(1)
Proposition 1 (Second auction). Consider the second auction. The equilibrium
strategy of player 1 (with V1 = v) depends on the history as follows: h11 ⇒ b21 = v,
h ∈ {h00,h01}⇒ G(b21), h = h10 ⇒ H(b21):
G : [0,qv]→ [0,1], G(b) = b(1−q)
(v−b)q =
b(1−ρ)
(v−b)ρF(0) (2)
H : [0,qv]→ [0,1], H(b) = v(1−q)
v−b =
v(1−ρ)
(v−b)(1−ρ +ρF(0)) , (3)
where H has one mass point at b = 0. The associated equilibrium continuation
payoffs are pi(h11) = 0,pi(h00) = pi(h10) = pi(h01) = v(1−q).
Proof. Equilibrium strategies and payoffs are self-evident for h11. Histories h01
and h10 result in an asymmetric, and history h00 in a symmetric one-shot auction,
solved in Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002, Prop. 3).
1Note, this belief system involves only a fairly innocent prescription of “off-equilibrium path”
beliefs by stipulating that Pr{V2 = v | b12 > 0}= 1 also for bids that are higher than “predicted”, i.e.
for b12 > b¯.
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Equilibrium in the first auction Signal jamming pays for bidder 1 only if bidder
2 has also a high valuation. However, signal jamming is costly, and its benefit
outweighs the cost only if it is sufficiently likely that bidder 1 meets a high value
bidder 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose ρ > 1/3. The equilibrium strategy in the first auction (con-
ditional on V = v) is F : [0, b¯]→ [0,1]:
F(b) :=
1−ρ
ρ
b
v−b +
v
v−b
√
3−4ρ +ρ2−2(1−ρ)
ρ
(4)
b¯ := v
(
2−ρ−
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
)
. (5)
F has a mass point at zero: F(0) =
√
(1/ρ−1)(3/ρ−1)− 2(1/ρ − 1) > 0 which
has a maximum at ρ = 3/4 and approaches zero as ρ → 1 and as ρ → 1/3.
Proof. Consider one bidder, say bidder 1 withV = v, and history h /0 (first auction).
To confirm the asserted equilibrium mixed strategy F , stated in (4), we must show
that this bidder is indifferent between all bids from the support of F , which is [0, b¯]
where b¯ is stated in (5).
If bidder 1 with V = v makes a bid b ∈ (0, b¯] his payoff is equal to
(v−b+pi(h11))ρ (F(b)−F(0))+(v−b+pi(h10))((1−ρ)+ρF(0)) . (6)
Whereas if he bids zero, his payoff is( v
2
+pi(h00)
)
(ρF(0)+(1−ρ))+pi(h01)ρ(1−F(0)). (7)
And the assertion follows immediately.
We mention that no signal jamming occurs if ρ ≤ 1/3; in that case, a high value
bidder plays the myopic strategy K : [0,ρv] → [0,1], K(b) := 1−ρ
ρ
b
v−b in the first
auction, and in the second auction bids v if he has observed a positive first-auction
bid from his rival, and otherwise bid zero. While this is the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, that equilibrium is not a sequential equilibrium.2
4 Signal-jamming
Signal-jamming occurs if a bidder with a high valuation bids zero in the first auc-
tion with positive probability, F(0) > 0, and thus sometimes mimics a bidder with
a low valuation in order to keep the rival uninformed.
2For, suppose V1 = v and consider history h00; consistency of beliefs requires that each bidder
believes that his rival has a zero valuation; but then bidding zero is not the best response of bidder 1
(in fact, no best response exists in that case).
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Altogether, bidder 1 benefits from signal jamming if and only if bidder 2 also has
a high valuation. Signal jamming leads bidder 2 to update his belief from ρ to
Pr{V1 = v | b11 = 0} = q < ρ instead of revealing bidder 1’s type, which in turn
induces him to bid stochastically lower, no matter how he bid in the first auction.
If bidder 2 made a positive bid in the first auction, he plays the stochastically lower
mixed strategyH(b) >G(b),∀b∈ [0,qv], and if he also engaged in signal jamming,
both bidders play the mixed strategy G which preserves a positive expected profit
in the second auction.
However, signal jamming is also costly since it entails the risk of losing the first
auction. It follows that it pays to “invest” in signal-jamming only if it is suffi-
ciently likely that the rival has a high valuation. Interestingly, this relationship is
not monotone, and F(0) has a global maximum at ρ = 3/4.
We mention that signal-jamming induces pointwise less aggressive bidding in the
first auction, in the sense that the myopic strategy K first-order stochastically dom-
inates the (continuously extended) strategy F¯(b) := max{F(b),1}, i.e., F¯(b) ≥
K(b),∀b ∈ [0,ρv].
5 Dynamics of equilibrium prices
The study of price sequences in sequential auctions has received much attention
in the literature (see, for example, McAfee and Vincent, 1993, Gale and Hausch,
1994, Jeitschko, 1999). In the present context, one might expect that prices be
stochastically increasing since signal jamming involves bidding low in the first
auction.
In the following assume ρ > 1/3 (because otherwise no signal jamming occurs and
equilibrium prices are stationary), and denote the continuously extended strategies
for the enlarged domain [0,v] by G¯(b) := min{G(b),1}, H¯(b) := min{H(b),1}.
Lemma 1. The probability distribution of the equilibrium price in the first auction,
FP1 : [0,v]→ [0,1], is
FP1(p) : = Pr{P1 ≤ p}
= Pr{b˜11 ≤ p and b˜12 ≤ p}
=
{
(1−ρ +ρF(p))2 if p≤ b¯
1 if p≥ b¯.
(8)
FP1 has exactly one mass point, FP1(0) =
(
(1−ρ)−
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
)2
> 0, which
is strictly decreasing in ρ with limρ→1FP1(0) = 0.
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Lemma 2. The probability distribution of the equilibrium price in the second auc-
tion, FP2 : [0,v]→ [0,1], is
FP2(p) = Pr{P2 ≤ p}
= ρ2
(
(1−F(0))2 ·0+F(0)2G¯(p)2 +2F(0)(1−F(0))G¯(p)H¯(p))
+2ρ(1−ρ)(F(0)G¯(p)+(1−F(0))H¯(p))+(1−ρ)2.
(9)
FP2 has mass points at p = 0 and p = v:
FP2(0) = (1−ρ)
√
3−4ρ +ρ2 > 0 (10)
Pr{P2 = v}=
(
2−ρ−
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
)2
> 0. (11)
Pr{P2 = v} is strictly increasing in ρ , and FP2(0) decreasing with limρ→1FP2(0) =
0.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium prices are increasing in the sense of first-order stochas-
tic dominance, FP2(p)≤ FP1(p) (with strict inequality except for p= v), if and only
if ρ is sufficiently large, i.e. ρ > ρ∗ := 2− 3/5√5.
This strong stochastic order does not apply to ρ ∈ (1/3,ρ∗). However, in either
case E[P2] > E[P1].
Proof. 1) Suppose ρ > ρ∗. Let p ∈ [0,v) and define (where the functions G and H
are applied to the enlarged domain [0,v)):
F˜P2(p) : = ρ
2
(
(1−F(0))2 ·0+F(0)2G(p)2 +2F(0)(1−F(0))G(p)H(p))
+2ρ(1−ρ)(F(0)G(p)+(1−F(0))H(p))+(1−ρ)2.
By definition, G(p) ≥ G¯(p),H(p) ≥ H¯(p), with equality for all p ∈ [0,qv] and
strict inequality for all p ∈ (qv,v). Therefore, it follows immediately that F˜P2(p)
is a pointwise upper bound of FP2(p), i.e., F˜P2(p) ≥ FP2(p), for all p ∈ [0,v), and
hence, in particular, for all p ∈ [0, b¯].
As one can easily confirm, FP1 > F˜P2(p),∀p ∈ [0, b¯] ⇐⇒ ρ > ρ∗. Since FP1(p) =
1,∀b ≥ b¯ and FP2 < 1,∀b < v (since it has a mass point at p = v), we conclude
that ρ > ρ∗ ⇒ FP2(p) ≤ FP1(p), with strict inequality everywhere except at p =
v, as illustrated in the right-hand Figure 1. Of course, the established first-order
stochastic dominance relationship implies E[P2] > E[P1].
2) Suppose ρ ∈ (1/3,ρ∗). Then, as one can easily confirm, FP2(0) > FP1(0). More-
over, FP1(p) = 1 > FP2(p),∀p ∈ [b¯,v) (since FP1(b¯) = 1 and FP2 has a mass point
at p = v). Therefore, FP2(p) and FP1(p) must intersect at least once; hence no first-
order stochastic dominance relationship applies to P2 and P1, as illustrated in the
left-hand Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Comparison between FP1 (dashed) and FP2 (solid) for v= 1 and ρ = 1/2 <
ρ∗ (left) resp. ρ = 3/4 > ρ∗ (right)
3) Computing expected equilibrium prices, one finds, using (8) and then (4), (5)),
E[P1] =
∫ v
0
pdFP1(p) =
∫ b¯
0
2p(1−ρ +ρF(p))ρdF(p)
= v
(
7−2ρ(4−ρ)−2(2−ρ)
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
)
.
Similarly, the expected price in the second auction auction is, using equations (9)
and (11),
E[P2] =
∫ v
0
pdFP2(p) =
∫ qv
0
pdFP2(p)+ vPr{P2 = v}
=
v
(
14−5ρ3 +25ρ2−34ρ− (8+5ρ2−14ρ)
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
)
√
3−4ρ +ρ2− (1−ρ)
Therefore, after some rearrangements, for all ρ > 1/3:
E[P1]−E[P2] = v
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
(
5ρ−7+4
√
3−4ρ +ρ2
)
< 0,
as asserted.
6 Discussion
In the present paper we assumed that bidders have stable valuations. An alterna-
tive framework would be to assume that valuations are subject to stochastic scale
effects, as in Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002).
We also assumed that bidders observe all first auction bids before they bid in the
second auction. If instead bidders could only learn whether they either won or
lost the first auction, in some subgames bidders would know the rank order of
valuations, as in Landsberger et al. (2001).
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Our analysis also assumed a passive auctioneer. Therefore, signal jamming served
exclusively the purpose of misleading the rival bidder. The incentive for signal
jamming is further increased if the auctioneer is able adjust reserve prices, taking
advantage of information acquired during the first auction.
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